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Abstract12—In many domains, automated reasoning tools 
must represent graphs of causally linked events.  These 
include fault-tree analysis, probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA), planning, procedures, medical reasoning about 
disease progression, and functional architectures.  Each of 
these fields has its own requirements for the representation 
of causation, events, actors and conditions.  The 
representations include ontologies of function and cause, 
data dictionaries for causal dependency, failure and hazard, 
and interchange formats between some existing tools.  In 
none of the domains has a generally accepted interchange 
format emerged.  The paper makes progress towards 
interoperability across the wide range of causal analysis 
methodologies.  We survey existing practice and emerging 
interchange formats in each of these fields.  Setting forth a 
set of terms and concepts that are broadly shared across the 
domains, we examine the several ways in which current 
practice represents them.  Some phenomena are difficult to 
represent or to analyze in several domains.  These include 
mode transitions, reachability analysis, positive and 
negative feedback loops, conditions correlated but not 
causally linked and bimodal probability distributions.  We 
work through examples and contrast the differing methods 
for addressing them.  We detail recent work in knowledge 
interchange formats for causal trees in aerospace analysis 
applications in early design, safety and reliability.  Several 
examples are discussed, with a particular focus on 
reachability analysis and mode transitions.  We generalize 
the aerospace analysis work across the several other 
domains.   We also recommend features and capabilities for 
the next generation of causal knowledge representation 
standards.  
Table of Contents
1. Introduction 1
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20060012131 2019-08-29T21:36:07+00:00Z
22. Causal Models and Interchange Formats 2
3. Representational Challenges 5
4. Conclusions 6
5. Acknowledgements 6
References 6
Biography 7
1. Introduction
Many disciplines reason with causal networks and must 
represent them.   Within a discipline, multiple tasks and 
tools must share the information in causal.  There are 
several efforts underway in different disciplines, all aimed 
at defining an interchange standard for causal networks.  
The current effort surveys emerging standards in Systems 
Engineering, medical reasoning, Bayesian networks and 
the representation of procedures.
All these efforts are generally moving towards XML 
representations of causality, but choosing XML (or RDF or 
OWL) is but a first step in defining a representation.   
Some basics are central to all the disciplines and will 
certainly be part of any emergent standard – 
There are events and conditions; ·
They have causal links between them; ·
Events, conditions and causes have associated ·
probabilities; 
Causes combine via logical operators (AND, OR and ·
NOT.)  
The thrust of this paper is toward describing the types of 
causal phenomena that could be captured in a 
comprehensive interchange format.  We have had 
discussions with practitioners in each of these disciplines. 
We elicited descriptions of the causal phenomena that are 
useful and common in reasoning tasks, but which present 
representational difficulties.  It is our hope that discussing 
these hard representational problems, with examples drawn 
from multiple domains, will drive the emergence of 
interchange formats that can represent the most complex 
causal phenomena and that can be shared across very 
different disciplines.
Standard formats for interchange, autogeneration and 
comprehensibility
 Users need standard formats so that they can model 
systems without being tied to a single tool or vendor.  
Moreover, users need standard formats so that they can 
automatically generate inputs from electronic sources.   
Fault-tree analysis (and the related PRA) illustrate this.  
There are several available tools and vendors for these 
analyses, each with its own virtues.  Models built in one 
tool are not generally readable by the others.  But there’s a 
larger problem.  Fault trees built in any of these tools are 
manually entered.  The knowledge source for this data 
entry has mostly come from some other electronic data 
source. E.g., it is taken from functional allocations, FMEA 
reports, the utility connectivity (power, data, thermal, lube) 
and from schematics (CAD, wiring diagrams, P&ID.)  This 
entry is incomplete – carrying all the relevant data from the 
sources is too laborious for a manual effort, so available 
information (part numbers, locations codes, the design 
engineer’s name) is omitted.  Worse, as soon as the fault 
tree is built, it is severed from its sources.  The system 
changes; its design changes; its parts are substituted, 
renamed and renumbered; its documentation is corrected.  
These updates do not flow into the fault trees.
Standard interchange formats for causal modeling tools will 
greatly reduce the manual data entry and resulting errors 
and omissions.  Users will automatically generate and 
update causal models from verified and version-controlled 
sources.  Users will be able to import causal information 
from libraries – libraries whose use can span multiple tools.  
This will also enable the analysis tools to add features that 
manual data entry renders impractical – features such as 
hyperlinks to manuals, photography, or viewing the source 
files (functional allocations, schematics FMEA sheets etc.)
Causal graphs have two very different major uses. They are 
employed so that automated inference engines can read 
them and perform analysis – automated diagnosis or PRA.  
But they also aid human comprehension – people look at 
(sometimes huge) causal graphs, asking questions.  “What 
went wrong? What would have to fail before we lost this 
capability?”  An interchange standard must not only 
address whether a format is machine-readable. It must also 
ensure that the encoded knowledge is human-inspectable.  
It’s not enough that machines understand these models.  
We have to, too.
2. Causal Models and Interchange Formats
In researching this work, we have been in contact with 
several groups in different disciplines that are working on 
interchange format standards for causal graphs or things 
akin to causal graphs.  The groups may learn from each 
other and might borrow other group’s best ideas.  
Accordingly, this section and the next will review briefly 
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highlighting any unusual or especially useful concepts, 
capabilities and representations.  
Vocabularies as aids to making the semantics of a node ·
explicit, available both to the tool and the user. 
Our own  work interchanging event sequences between ·
an ontology and a simulation engine
Several emerging standards for interchange formats·
Representational challenges – causal relationships that ·
are difficult to represent; attention to these during standards 
formulation might extend the representational scope.
We’ve mentioned several fields that use causal models.  
These represent scenarios as directed graphs (often trees) of 
causally linked events.  Some features are common across 
all the domains and most of the tools.  Nodes in the graphs 
generally represent events or conditions; edges represent 
causality.  There are special nodes in the graph, called 
gates, which combine causation through simple logical 
operators (and, or, not) or higher-order operators (xor, 
nand, k-of-m or arbitrary truth tables.)  The models are 
usually built with nodes uniformly either being successes or 
failures; there are methods for transforming between 
success-space representations and failure-space 
representations.  Nodes with only incoming edges (such as 
the root of a tree) represent some final state of interest.  
Nodes with only outgoing edges (the leaves of a tree) are 
‘basic events’ for which no causal explanation is necessary 
or available.  Probabilities – representing the likelihood or 
frequency of a condition being true – are associated with 
the basic events and can be computed for other nodes.
Causal models in various fields
 Let us review the prominent causal-network 
representations from different fields, and any associated 
interchange formats.  Our interest in interchange formats 
for causal models was sparked by our risk-analysis work in 
functional and physical models.  [10]  Our software 
generates event sequences for potential accident scenarios.  
We needed to communicate these scenarios between 
software tools.  We sought any existing interchange 
formats, rather than inventing our own.  [Jane, do I need to 
say more about RTSAD and ECS here?] Practitioners in 
many fields perform causal modeling; our work is most 
akin to the work in fault trees.  
In fault trees, [17] the root of the tree is some ‘top event’ – 
a failure that has occurred and is being investigated, or a 
potential failure to guard against.  Analysis generates ‘cut 
sets’ – sets of basic events that are sufficient to cause the 
top event.  Fault trees are composable – fault trees for 
individual components can be produced separately, and a 
system level fault tree can reference them.  Some causal 
propagations depend upon a system’s state or 
configuration; Dynamic Fault trees conditionalize subtrees 
accordingly.  In some situations, causes are mutually 
reinforcing.  The fault tree methodology does not allow 
circular causality; there are techniques for breaking these 
feedback loops. 
Figure 1: Success-space and failure-space models can be 
intercoverted.
Probabilistic Risk/Reliability Assessment (PRA) [15] is an 
extension to fault trees wherein probabilities are assigned to 
the nodes and the likelihood of the top event is calculated.  
It is customarily used to evaluate likelihood of success of an 
overall project or mission, and to focus attention on areas 
where loss is most likely to occur. The extension noted for 
Dynamic Fault trees allows PRA to span missions where 
the configuration and the risks repeatedly change; e.g. the 
launch, mission and return of a spacecraft
Two software suites, saphire [14] and cafta, are the most-
used fault-tree analysis and PRA tools in aerospace.  Both 
are descended from set, a 1980’s era fault tree tool.  Its file 
format became a de facto standard interchange format.  
Saphire, cafta and some other tools can save models in this 
format.  But the fault tree field has advanced.  Set’s format 
is inadequate today; for instance, it can represent the 
combination of two conditions (and or or,) but not the 
negation of a condition (not.)  It does not encode events’ 
probabilities (e.g. Mean Time Between Failure, MTBF.)  
There is no common interchange format between saphire 
and cafta, but there is a NASA-commissioned software that 
translates between saphire’s MAR-D format and cafta.
Root cause analysis [3] represents scenarios similarly to 
fault trees.  It concentrates mainly on analyzing undesirable 
events that have already occurred.  The trees are built in 
failure space. Nodes, gates and edges have essentially the 
same semantics as in fault tree. Probabilities are not 
represented and cut sets are not generated.  Root cause 
analysis allows inclusion of causes that were not present in 
4the actual sequence – alternative conditions which could 
have caused or prevented the loss, if they had been present.  
It has an explicit representation of when causal chains have 
crossed organizational boundaries (and are thus out of the 
direct control of the investigating team.)
Bayesian networks employ causal networks similar to PRA 
trees.  Nodes in both techniques store probabilities, but the 
semantics of a probability varies between the approaches. 
Edges in a Bayesian network can describe correlation, 
rather than causation per se.  Some Bayesian networks 
associate a probability with causal edges as well as with the 
nodes.  Bayesian networks are used both for diagnostics and 
prognostics.  A proposed Bayesian Network Interchange 
Format [12] includes representations for probability 
distributions (including multi-modal distributions) not just 
fixed-point probabilities.
Procedures are event sequences and there is normally at 
least an implicit causal linkage between procedure steps.  
Copma iii [2] has developed an Extensible Procedure 
Action, or XPA, as an XML representation of procedures.   
XPA does not represent probabilities. It does not use logical 
gates; it has Condition blocks that evaluate comparative 
relationships (equality, precedence) that supply similar 
functionality.  Copma iii holds much of its procedure 
descriptions as blocks of natural-language text, related 
graphically as predecessor/successor and parent/child 
relations.  It explicitly represents whether subtasks may be 
performed sequentially or in parallel [1] 
Qualitative Reasoning [6] is not, strictly speaking, a causal 
network model; its networks represent simultaneous non-
directional constraints.  It bears mentioning because its M+ 
constraint captures a causal relationship between 
continuous variables.  M+(Voltage, Current) means the 
voltage and current must increase together.  In Qualitative 
Process Theory [5] this relation implies an influence rather 
than a fixed constraint – increasing voltage tends to 
increase current, if other influences do not change.  Neither 
methodology uses an interchange format.  The M- 
constraint is analogous.  The d/dt constraint expresses a 
time-derivative relation, e.g. d/dt(Position, Velocity).
Controlled Vocabularies
In medicine, the HL7 (an ANSI Standards Development 
Organization, www.hl7.org) is developing the Reference 
Information Model, RIM [19].  RIM is not an interchange 
format; it is an approach to specifying data formats.   The 
RIM orders how medical terms can be composed (how to 
specify a concept like “a benign fibrous tumor partially 
removed from the anterior of the liver.”) This is done using 
controlled vocabularies (organized in taxonomies, or 
ontologies) and compositional rules.  RIM is a meta-
standard for specifications; several sets of RIM-compliant 
terminologies are being advanced, including SNOMED  
[20], GLIF [21] and GELLO [22]. 
Neither RIM nor these approaches specifies a causal-
network interchange format per se. But RIM’s use of 
controlled vocabularies is applicable to causal networks. In 
causal networks, nodes have names, which represent 
conditions, events, actions etc.  In the other methodologies 
surveyed so far, the node names are free-form natural 
language text. The user can put any arbitrary text string in 
the name; automated inference engines analyzing the graph 
do not use the string except to report results.
Controlled vocabularies offer several advantages.  A node 
name would be a well-formed composition of defined 
entities and actions.  This would allow authoring tools to 
prompt users for default causes, automation of model-
checking (spotting causal links that don’t make sense, or 
inferring missing links) and to automate the linking of 
causal-graph tools to other online resources (databases, 
webpages, illustrations and photography…)  Controlled 
vocabularies make information more comprehensible to 
users, too.  Medical terminology suffers from the 
“Shakespeare Syndrome” – a profusion of different (long, 
Latinized) terms, all meaning the same thing.  (A heart 
attack is a myocardial infarction is acute coronary heart 
disease..) Practitioners frequently do not understand each 
others’ jargon.  This is not just a problem across national 
boundaries; it’s an issue when sending medical records 
between departments within a hospital.  Controlled 
vocabularies allow practitioners to be sure they are 
understanding each other.  We know this is also an issue in 
the aerospace community; we believe it bedevils other 
communities as well.
Interchange between specification and simulation
Our own work [8,9,10] provides an interchange format 
between two software tools.  HIT (Hazard Identification 
Toolkit, implemented in Protégé) holds a functional model 
of a system  (including its normal and abnormal operation.)  
CONFIG is a hybrid discrete/continuous simulator.  
The two applications are interfaced to assist in identifying 
hazards in the operation of a system. A user of HIT 
constructs the system model from components selected 
from the HIT library of component classes and component 
connections. The description of a HIT component class may 
specify the entities that are the products and side effects 
generated by the component in different modes of operation 
and also the component’s vulnerabilities to external entities 
while in a given mode. 
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analysis that finds paths over which an entity generated by 
one component in the system may reach other components 
for which the entity generated is specified as a 
vulnerability. Such a completed path may be viewed as a 
potential hazard to the system’s functioning. 
The user may then construct an operational scenario that 
could produce the hazardous situation. The HIT model can 
then be translated to a CONFIG model, and the operational 
scenario can similarly be translated to a script to be 
executed by the CONFIG simulator. 
While CONFIG has no formal representations of hazards 
and vulnerabilities, its numerical simulation capabilities 
may be used to further assess the plausibility and severity of 
potentially hazardous scenarios identified by HIT. HIT 
creates a specification for a CONFIG system model, and 
also sends a hazard scenario (an accident or potential 
accident) to CONFIG.  HIT has reasoned qualitatively that 
a scenario is of concern; CONFIG confirms it in a 
numerical simulation.  The HIT/CONFIG scenario 
interchange format specifies features applicable to any 
causal-model interchange format.  It distinguishes between 
different item-classes: functions, entities, hazards, 
mitigations and behaviors.  It locates these items in 
computational ontologies.  That is, there are taxonomies 
(inheritance hierarchies) of item-classes, with attributes for 
the classes.  Events in the scenario are built by using 
composing these items and assigning attribute values.
Emerging standards for interchange formats
There is widespread recognition of the usefulness of a 
standard interchange format, especially for fault trees and 
PRA.  Several groups are proposing standards.  
Standard for the Exchange of Product model data, or STEP 
(ISO-10303) [13] is an existing family of International 
Standard for the computer-interpretable representation and 
exchange of product data.  It is in use in the Systems 
Engineering community.  A team is working on its AP233 
and AP239, which will include a standard for representing 
fault trees. STEP currently models in EXPRESS, an 80's-
era format.  AP239 will move to a Uniform Modeling 
Language (UML) representation.  Working in tandem with 
the AP239 effort, SysML Partners, in its Systems Modeling 
Language effort [16], is developing modeling standards for 
fault trees.
ISO-17666 [18] Space Systems – Risk Management is an 
emerging standard, originating from the European Space 
Agency.  While it doesn’t set forth representational 
standards for causal graphs per se, its documentation 
standards for risks call out relevant features and a standard 
terminology for risks.  Its risks are similar to fault tree’s top 
events.  Its definition and procedures for determining event 
criticality could provide the semantics for criticality 
measures in an interchange format.
3. Representational Challenges
There is much commonality in all these methodologies.  
Presumably, that which is common is sure to be included in 
any new representational standard.  But today, complex 
causal explanations are not usually captured in any 
computer readable format, be it proprietary or open.  For 
the most part, though, these causal explanations are 
captured in English text, diagrams and animated 
PowerPoint charts.  For an excellent example of this, see 
[4]. Any emerging representational standard should 
anticipate its most demanding applications.  It should be 
capable of expressing complex causal relationships – 
relationships that exceed the expressiveness of any of 
today’s software tools.  As we researched the domains 
discussed in the last section, we questioned practitioners.  
We asked, “What critical causal relationships are most 
taxing? Most difficult to explain, to represent, to reason 
about?  What critical thing is likely to get left out of a 
standard?”  This section synthesizes their answers, along 
with our own experiences in automating reasoning about 
causation.
Good computing practice—The standard should encode for 
each node and each edge: 
Its name·
An author·
The creation and modification dates (with an explicit ·
standard for date format)
A unique ID (unique within the causal model)·
A package (so that multiple causal models can be ·
composed without ID conflict)
An optional reference ID (pointing back to the ·
informational source, such as an identifier in a wiring 
diagram)
A comment field (with an explicit standard about what ·
characters are allowed)
The condition or variable which the node represents, ·
with Boolean values. enumerated values, or numeric ranges 
with units
A list of labeled URLs, pointing to associated or ·
supplemental information.
Complex relationships—There are relationships that tax the 
expressive ability of today’s tools.  We do not know the best 
ways to encode them in a standard, but any group 
producing a standard interchange format should address 
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Exploded/Subsumption relations – generally, each causal ·
step in an event sequence can potentially be expanded into 
its own causal network.  The lower level network may take 
inputs from conditions and events not shown at the higher 
level.
Feedback loops – fault-tree analysis and PRA prohibits ·
causal feedback loops.  The representation should store the 
location where the loop is broken.  It should also be 
possible to specify information about the loop itself – 
whether it is positive or negative feedback, the gain around 
the loop, or the time-constants associated with it.
Most cyclic behaviors are representable as closed causal ·
loops.  Cyclic behavior is abstracted to parameters 
(frequency, amplitude, gain, decay rate) at a higher level.  
Causal inputs at the lower cyclic level must flow up to the 
parameter level.
Time to effect – causal links may have latencies·
Alternative testimonies of events – Accident reports are ·
used to build a fault tree.  Witnesses may give contradictory 
testimony.  Fault trees don’t currently capture this.
Divergent/Convergent causation – Cause C1 increases ·
intermediate condition I1 and decreases I2.  I1 and I2 both 
promote effect E1, so C1 has a mixed effect on E1. 
Represent the information that one leg of the causal chain 
is stronger than the other, and that  increasing C1 tends to 
increase E1.
Discretization – Causal reasoning involve converting ·
ranges of continuous variables into discrete-valued 
variables.  A numeric temperature value gets simplified 
into Hot/Normal/Cold.  The numeric endpoints of the 
qualitative ranges may be conditionalized on the system 
state. 
Represent mode transitions.·
Represent events that are correlated but where causality ·
is unknown.
Systematic conditions can affect the probabilities of many ·
nodes at once.  Poor maintenance, corrosive environments, 
inadequate training, financial pressure, low morale, 
startup/turnaround… These systemic effects should be 
representable without having causal edges drawn from each 
systemic cause to every single affected node.
A causal subgraph may be repeated in a large causal ·
graph, representing multiple instances of the same general 
type, but with different inputs.  E.g. in a fault tree, a loss 
may have been caused by a series of operational errors 
caused by inexperienced personnel.  Joe was out with the 
flu Wednesday; Jane was out with the flu Friday.  The 
‘employee sick’ subgraph should be instantiated twice, with 
different values.
Race conditions occur when there are two causal chains ·
with opposite effects; whichever finishes first controls.  
Again, these need to explicitly representable and 
abstractable to a higher level.
Software fails differently than do components. In fault ·
tree/PRA, it is conventional to treat software failure 
similarly to either a component failure or to a human error.  
But software failure is unique. Any representational 
standard must pay particularly close attention to the special 
representational demands of software, and the particular 
ways it fails.  A discussion of this exceeds the scope of this 
article, but interested readers should consult [7].
Presentation—Graphs are viewed graphically; the 
graphical presentation of a causal network should also be 
preserved across tools.  This presentation information need 
not be part of node and edge definitions. But somehow the 
standard should associate with nodes and edges: 
Size, shape, shape orientation (rotation)·
Line and border thickness, dash-pattern, arrowhead size·
Color, transparency, shading·
Text font, font size, centering and justification·
Superscripting, subscripting, bold, italic ·
X,Y center-position information for nodes·
X,Y anchor points (vertices)  and curvature for edges·
Back-to-Front ordering (what items are ‘in front of’ other ·
items)
Sequence ordering (time-ordering nodes’ appearance in ·
an animated view) 
Groupings (sets of items that can be selected and moved ·
as a unit)
Icons (e.g., different .gif images for conditions, functions, ·
mitigations)
A page, or sheet (specify that some subsection of the ·
overall graph appears in a single view)
Boxes that enclose multiple nodes locate events w.r.t. ·
equipment or organizations, and emphasize when causal 
chains cross system boundaries.
Free text and graphics that can be placed in the graphic ·
view, not associated with particular nodes and edges (e.g., a 
key for the graphic conventions.)
Certain causal relationships should have standard graphical 
representation 
Links to nodes distant or  in other subgraphs.·
Inhibition, representing ‘When A is true, it breaks the ·
causal link from B to C.’  (Logically, this can be composed 
with NOT and AND gates, but a more compact graphic 
representation is desirable.  See [4] for illustration.)
M+, M- and d/dt relations·
Binary or enumerated variables which each variable-·
value enables a different causal path.
Higher-order logical operators (xor, nand, k-of-m, iff or ·
arbitrary truth tables)
Top nodes and basic events·
74. Conclusions
Teams in several fields are creating standard interchange 
formats.  These formats will keep modelers from being 
tethered to a single proprietary tool, will allow 
autogeneration of causal models, and will allow causal 
analysis tools to be integrated to auxiliary services.  The 
several teams should consider coordinating their efforts and 
borrowing the best ideas across disciplines.  They should 
also ensure that the forthcoming standards can encode the 
most difficult modeling challenges – causal relationships 
that exceed the scope of any of today’s tools.  The standards 
should address the graphical presentation of causal models, 
so that both machines and people can read the causal 
knowledge.
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In many domains, automated reasoning tools represent graphs of causally linked events.  
These include fault-tree analysis, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), planning, 
procedures, medical reasoning about disease progression, and functional architectures. 
Each of these fields has its own requirements for the representation of causation, events, 
actors and conditions. The representations include ontologies of function and cause, data 
dictionaries for causal dependency, failure and hazard, and interchange formats between 
some existing tools. In none of the domains has a generally accepted interchange format 
emerged. The paper surveys existing practice and emerging interchange formats in each of 
these fields. Setting forth a set of terms and concepts that are broadly shared across the 
domains, we examine the several ways in which current practice represents them. Some 
phenomena are difficult to represent or to analyze in several domains. These include mode 
transitions, reachability analysis, positive and negative feedback loops, conditions 
correlated but not causally linked and bimodal probability distributions. We work through 
examples and contrast the differing methods for addressing them. We detail recent work in 
knowledge interchange formats for causal trees in aerospace analysis applications in early 
design, safety and reliability. We generalize the aerospace analysis work across the several 
other domains. We also recommend features and capabilities for the next generation of 
causal knowledge representation standards.  
